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NOTES
DO COMPULSORY WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION?
It seems certain that the Missouri legislature will tardily follow
the lead of thirty-one states, the Federal Government and most of
the territories, by passing a workmen's compensation law at its next
session. Although these statutes are beginning to attract the atten-
tion of Missouri lawyers, the burden of investigation of such legis-
lation in this state seems to have fallen on the able shoulders of
Mr. Alroy S. Phillips of the St. Louis Bar. In a recent pamphlet
issued by the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Conference he has
thoroughly discussed the policy and principles involved in the meas-
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ure proposed for Missouri, with some attention to the legal problems
offered by such an act.
All of the law connected with workmen's compensation in this
country is in a very undeveloped and amorphous state. No two of
the statutes are alike. Judicial interpretation also varies from state
to state. At best, the legal problems are difficult, impinging as they
do upon the law of Master and Servant, Proximate Causation, Insur-
ance Law, Conflict of Laws, and Constitutional Law. Most of the
books on the subject, like those of Boyd and Bradbury, are based upon
experience under the British Act, and are in other respects out of
date, and even the careful summary in Lawyers' Reports Annotated,1
cannot keep pace with rapid judicial and legislative departments.
Among the doubtful questions connected with these laws is that
of the constitutionality of provisions making payment by insurance
of the claims of injured workmen compulsory upon employers. Seven
states out of the thirty-one have passed compulsory laws,2 and without
going into the merits and policy of the matter, it appears to be the
opinion of those who have had experience in administration that the
compulsory form is more desirable than the so-called "elective" laws
which abrogate the common law defenses (assumption of risk, con-
tributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule) and leave to the
employer the option of coming under the law or facing possible litiga-
tion without these important defenses.3 For in spite of the "club" in
the elective laws it has been found -that large numbers of employers
take the risk and stay outside the operation of the statute.
A general opinion seems to prevail, which is expressed by
Mr. Phillips in his treatment of the subject, that compulsory laws,
with the usual provisions requiring insurance, are contrary to the
guarantees of the state and Federal constitution, more particularly
to those articles which prohibit taking of property without due process
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1916 D.
2 Ohio, California, Arizona, Washington, New York, Oklahoma,
Wyoming.
3 Massachusetts Accident Board. Annual Report 1913.
"It has become evident that as a matter of justice and public
welfare, compensation acts, should be uniform and compulsory, and
apply to all employees and occupations alike." See also Report of
the New Jersey Employers' Liability Commission in 1915. Trenton,
1916. Their first recommendation is "the passage of a compulsory
compensation law" in place of the present elective law. Also Con-
-ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Report of Com-
mittee on Compensation for Industrial Accidents, 1914. "Best re-
sults can be obtained only through a compulsory law."
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of law, and which guarantee trial by jury. The latter objection, based
on the fact that most laws are administered by commission, seems to
have occupied but little attention, since under all of the laws there is
appeal or other recourse to the courts on matters of law, and has
been summarily disposed of where it has come up.4 So that the ques-
tion narrows itself down to a consideration of those guarantees which
are found in all state constitutions, as to due process of law, and in
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 5
The issue is stated by Mr. Phillips as follows: "The trend of the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States is that while
there is no other objection to a compulsory law as far as the employer
is concerned, it may be a violation of the due process clause of the
constitution to make him liable irrespective of negligence, unless the
law is passed in a valid exercise of the police power of the state, which
is generally understood to mean that its application must be limited
to enumerated extra-hazardous employments." Now it is impossible
to be dogmatic on a subject that has not been passed upon by the
Supreme Court, but it is certain that the decisions of that court on
the police power, and recent state decisions directly in point, greatly
discredit the belief that the laws are unconstitutional. In the first
place, there are no decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject.
There seems to be no basis whatever for the "general understanding"
that compulsory laws must be limited as suggested, for as a matter
of fact two of the compulsory laws are not so limited, and decisions
repudiate the distinction. Finally, very recent state decisions point
most decidedly to the constitutionality of the laws.
I.
It is impossible to define the limits of the police power in any
precise way. But the following well-known dicta of the United States
Supreme Court show that the interpretations are increasingly liberal,
and are the only guide to the nature and extent of the power.
"We premise that the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
referred to (that relative to the equal protection of the laws) was
undoubtedly intended to prohibit an arbitrary deprivation of life or
liberty, or an arbitrary spoliation of property. But it does not limit
4 The only case in which this objection has been raised is State v.
Clausen, infra, in which the court decides that the law does not offend
in this respect.
5 See Constitution of the State of Missouri, Article II, Secs. 20 and 30.
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nor was intended to limit, the subject upon which the police power
of the states may be lawfully exerted."
"The police power is not subject to any definite limitation, but
is co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguards of
the public interests."
'7
"This court has not failed to recognize the fact that the law is,
to a certain extent, a progressive science; that in some states, methods
of procedure which, at the time that the constitution was adopted
were deemed essential to the protection and safety of the people, or to
the liberty of the citizen, have been found to be no longer necessary;
that restrictions which had formerly been laid upon the conduct of
individuals had proved detrimental to their interests; while upon the
other hand certain other classes of persons, particularly those engaged
in dangerous or unhealthful occupations, have been found to be in
need of additional protection."8
"We hold that the police power of the state embraces regula-
tions designed to promote the public convenience or general prosper-
ity as well as regulations designed to promote the public morals, or
the public safety."
It may be seen that the last definitions are considerably broader
than the first. But of all the decisions and the dicta upon which the
state courts have relied in their decisions on workmen's compensa-
tion the most important and controlling is the following from Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes' opinion in Noble State Bank v. Haskell. 10
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends
to all the great public needs. Camfield v. U. S., 167 U. S. 518. It
may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by
the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion, to be
greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."
II.
As to the necessity of limiting the application of the law to classi-
fied extra-hazardous employments for the purpose of bringing it under
the police power, the fictitious nature of such classification has been
repeatedly recognized by the courts:
"It is frankly admitted by the appellant that it is within the
6 Mr. Justice White in Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 182.
7 Mr. Justice Brown in Canfield v. U. S., 167 U. S. 518.
8 Mr Justice Brown in Holden r. Hardy, 169 U. S. 385.
C.. B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 341. Mr Justice Harlan.10 219 U. S. 104.
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legislative power to make this change with regard to hazardous trades,
but not with regard to what are called the non-hazardous trades. But
why not? . . We see absolutely no ground for the contention
that these defenses may be lawfully abrogated as to the more hazard-
ous industries, but must be forever held sacred to the less hazard-
ous industries. There may be a less persuasive reason for the change
in the latter class of industries, but this does not deprive the legisla-
ture of the power to make it."11
"There is no reason of necessity or propriety-there is no reason
whatever that occurs to us-why a common carrier should be sub-
jected to liability to his bookkeeper or to his clerk in his general offices
. . . or to any other of his servants who is not actually engaged in
some such hazardous occupation as operating engines or trains,
while the merchant, the manufacturer, and all other persons, are
exempt from such liability to their servants engaged in the perform-
ance of the same work under the same circumstances."'
12
"The legislative power to impose the liability upon an employer
who is without fault does not, in view of the courts which have dealt
with the subject, rest upon the consideration that the particular
employer is conducting an industry in which injury is more likely
to result than in some other."' s
Apparently it has never occurred to those who raise this objec-
tion to examine at first hand what is meant by "extra-hazardous"
industries. In the New York compulsory statute, the hazardous
employments are divided into 43 classes of from six to twenty-five
employments, and embracing as a matter of expert testimony, all
occupations except strictly mercantile pursuits. The Washington stat-
ute is even more liberal in its definition. The other compulsory laws
are admittedly modeled on these two where they mention the words
"hazardous" at all. Two compulsory laws, Ohio and California,
include all industrial occupations, making no distinction whatever. And
the California law, as will be explained below, has been pronounced
constitutional.
Therefore it seems hardly possible that the Supreme Court of
the United States will base its decision of the constitutionality of
these laws on any academic distinction of the sort.
11 Borgins v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327.
12Railway v. Westby, 178 Fed. 619.
Is Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 682.
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III.
Coming now to direct decisions on the constitutionality of com-
pulsory accident insurance laws, there are four cases directly in point
decided by state courts of last resort. These cases are summarized
and discussed at length in the able annotation on Workmen's Com-
pensation in Lawyers' Reports Annotated. 24
The source of the general skepticism on the constitutionality of
these laws is the case of Ives v. South Buffalo Ry.,15 decided in 1911.
The purport of the decision was that the law took property without
due process of law, by imposing liability without fault. The ground
of the decision is clear. The court simply says: "It is taking the
property of A and giving it to B," or again "It does nothing to con-
serve the health, safety and morals of the employee." Liability
without fault is unconstitutional. The reasoning of the court is exactly
opposed to that of subsequent decisions, one of which was handed
down by the same court. But this is notable, that the statute under
consideration differed from the latter statutes, so that although the
dicta are opposed, the decisions may be distinguished. The first New
York law'0 provided no means whatever of distributing the burden
imposed upon the employer; it was not an insurance law at all. The
case caused much popular criticism of the New York Court, not to
speak of expert legal condemnation.
Directly contra to the Ives case, and in terms overruling it is
the recent decision (July, 1915) of the same court in Jensen v. South-
ern Pacific Ry., T upholding the constitutionality of the present com-
pulsory New York law, which was passed subsequent to amendment
of the state constitution, but which nevertheless declares that the
law is valid under the same Fourteenth Amendment under which the
other was declared unconstitutional. The court distinguishes the
two acts: "That act made no attempt to distribute the burden. This
act does in effect as well as in theory distribute the burden equally
over the industries affected. The two acts are therefore, so plainly
dissimilar that the decision in the Ives case is not controlling in this."
But it does not attempt to reconcile the divergent theories upon which
the two cases were decided. For instance, in the latter case, the
court found Noble State Bank v. Haskell, supra, controlling on the
4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1916 D., p. 409.
is201 N. Y. 271.
I6 C. 674, Laws of 1910.
If 215 N. Y. 519.
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police power question ("the decision in Noble State Bank v. Haskell
is decisive"), while the court in the Ives case vehemently refused to
follow the U. S. Supreme Court, saying of the case and another similar
to it, "we cannot regard them as controlling."
The case of State ex rel. Davis Smith Co. v. Clausen,18 (1915)
pronounced the present Washington law constitutional as to due proc-
ess, equal protection, and trial by jury. The opinion gives examples
of liability without fault to discredit the Ives decision, and relies on
Holden v. Hardy and Bank v. Haskell for its definition of the police
power. The court lays much stress on the point that the law is a
reasonable exercise of the police power, and not such a capricious
and arbitrary exercise as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court frankly refused to follow the Ives decision.
The case of Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury19 (August, 1915),
pronounced the present California law valid. The case is significant
for two reasons. In the first place, California did not pass an amend-
ment to her state constitution to permit the law, as the other states
have done. Second, the California law is inclusive of all industrial
employments, regardless of hazard. The case was brought up on a
certiorari to the Industrial Accident Commission. (Note that the
Washington case above came up on a writ of mandamus to the state
auditor.) The California court quotes the Clausen case extensively
and distinguishes the Ives case; it also makes reference to the Jansen
case. Holding that "liability without fault is not new to the law" it
declares that the state statute "merely changes the existing rules gov-
erning the liability of masters . . . to their servants," and "does
not affect past transactions of previously acquired rights of person
or property."
As far as the general development of the law is concerned, all
of these cases are significant as showing the present inclination of
courts (which will probably appear in the Supreme Court with recent
changes in its personnel) to regard policy and the need of new laws
to meet modern industrial conditions. The Washington court quotes
"the enlightened opinion of mankind" in the same breath with legal
precedents. The New York court evidences the new spirit in the
following: "This subject should be viewed in the light of modem
conditions, not those under which the common law doctrines were
developed. With the change in industrial conditions an opinion has
1865 Wash. 156.
19170 Cal. 686.
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* gradually grown up which almost universally favors a more just and
economical system of providing for accidental injuries to employees,
as a substitute for wasteful and protracted damage suits, usually un-
just in their results either to the employer or the employee, and some-
times to both." The California court also recognizes that the old dam-
age suit system, "involves intolerable delay and great economic waste.
gives inadequate relief for loss and suffering, . . . and is unsuited
to the conditions of modem industry." "The theory of this legisla-
tion is that the risk of injury to workmen . . . should be borne
by the industries, rather than by the individual workman alone."
It appears then, that by the weight of authority compulsory com-
pensation laws, including the insurance scheme, are established on a
constitutional basis. The only effect of the opinion in the historic
I-ves case is in the words of the L. R. A. annotator that "it is probable
that in future workmen's compensation acts will provide for insur-
ance rather than direct liability."
Since there is nothing in the Missouri Constitution to alter the
situation, and since judicial opinion upholds the constitutionality of
such laws, there is no reason why Missouri should not have the most
efficient, inclusive and far-reaching compensation law in the country.
WALSTON CHUBB, '18.
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